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Hollywood on the Bayou: An Optimal Tax Approach
to Evaluating and Reforming the Louisiana Motion
Picture Investor Tax Credit
INTRODUCTION
As Louisiana experiences record-setting growth in the film
industry, awareness of the Louisiana Motion Picture Investor Tax
Credit (MPITC)1 is more widespread than ever.2 In 1992, Louisiana
was the first state to roll out a major film subsidy program.3 Then in
2002, the Louisiana Legislature set out to “encourage development
in Louisiana of a strong capital and infrastructure base for motion
picture production in order to achieve an independent, selfsupporting industry.”4 Since the advent of the Louisiana MPITC,
Louisiana has steadily gained recognition as a new hub for the film
and television industry.5 In 2011, a record 150 productions applied
for the film tax credits.6 For the productions that qualify, the
incentives are significant: a 30% tax credit for spending at least
$300,000 on productions filmed in Louisiana.7
The MPITC has benefited the State of Louisiana considerably.
Between 2008 and 2010, the annual volume of films produced in
Louisiana increased by 175%.8 In 2010, the Louisiana film industry
Copyright 2014, by AMELIA HURT.
1. For the duration of this Comment, the Louisiana Motion Picture Investor
Tax Credit will be referred to as MPITC.
2. The recent record-setting growth in Louisiana film production was largely
expected in part because of the increase in highly publicized films since the
Legislature’s enactment of filmmaking tax incentives. See Mike Scott, Louisiana
Film Industry Passes Billion-Dollar Mark in Record-Setting 2011, THE TIMESPICAYUNE (Jan. 7, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.nola.com/movies/index.ssf
/2012/01/louisiana _film_industry_passes.html (noting that the Louisiana film
industry’s growth should come as no “surprise to anybody who’s been paying
attention over the past decade” because of the consistent increase in major studio
films shot in Louisiana).
3. TIM MATHIS, LOUISIANA FILM TAX CREDITS: COSTLY GIVEAWAY TO
HOLLYWOOD, LOUISIANA BUDGET PROJECT (Aug. 2012), http://www.labudget.org
/lbp/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/LBP-Report.Louisiana-Film-Tax-Credits.pdf.
4. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009) (amended 2013).
5. Richard A. Webster, Year in Review: Hollywood South Sets New Records,
NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS. (Dec. 30, 2011, 2:51 PM), http://neworleans
citybusiness.com/blog/2011/12/30/year-in-review-hollywood-south-sets-newrecords.
6. Id.
7. § 47:6007(C)(1)(c)(i).
8. CHERYL LOUISE BAXTER, FISCAL & ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF
LOUISIANA’S ENTERTAINMENT INCENTIVES (2011), available at http://louisiana
entertainment.gov/docs/main/louisiana_entertainment_2011_economic_impact_an
alysis.pdf.
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became a billion-dollar player in the nationwide film market.9
Louisiana is now ranked third in the country in film production
activity, and the industry supports thousands of jobs in Louisiana
that previously did not exist.10 Additionally, motion picture
production companies and their employees spend money that would
not otherwise benefit Louisiana residents and businesses.11
Louisianans also enjoy the notoriety and excitement of living in
“Hollywood South.”12 Some of the most highly publicized films
released in 2012 took advantage of the MPITC. The popular
Twilight Saga: Breaking Dawn, Parts I and II directly contributed
$189.3 million in economic activity in Louisiana while earning
$33.2 million in tax credits.13 This translates to approximately $5.70
in direct economic activity generated for every $1 of state tax credits
awarded.14 Meanwhile, Abraham Lincoln: Vampire Hunter resulted
in $61.5 million in contributed economic activity and earned $19.3
million in tax credits,15 which translates to approximately $3.19 in
direct economic activity for every $1 in state tax credits awarded to
the production.16
Unfortunately, these results do not tell the whole story. An
economic analysis by BaxStarr Consulting Group showed that
motion picture production generated $27 million in state tax revenue
in 2010 while the State certified $196.8 million in tax credits.17 This
figure indicates that the State is paying roughly $7.29 per every $1 it
collects as a result of the MPITC.18 The State of Louisiana is losing
9. Scott, supra note 2.
10. Adriana Lopez, A New Economic Report Surfaces, but It Could Have a
Hollywood South Ending, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2012, 12:58 PM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/adrianalopez/2012/08/10/a-new-economic-report-surfaces-but-it-couldhave-a-hollywood-south-ending.
11. John Grand, Motion Picture Tax Incentives: There’s No Business Like
Show Business, 39 STATE TAX NOTES 10 (2006), available at http://taxprof
.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/2006-2997-1.pdf.
12. Matthew J. Bailey, Hollywood South: Why Film Credits Are Good for
Louisiana, 48 STATE TAX NOTES 715 (2008), available at http://thelouisiana
wavestudio.com/pdfs/Tax_Analyst_LA_Film_Credits.pdf.
13. Michelle Millhollon, Panel to Review Tax Incentives, THE ADVOCATE
(July 1, 2012) (on file with the Louisiana Law Review). These economic
contributions include payroll, purchases, and other economic activity in Louisiana.
14. $189.3 million/$33.2 million = $5.70 generated for every $1 of state
investment.
15. Millhollon, supra note 13.
16. $61.5 million/$19.3 million = $3.19 generated for every $1 state
investment.
17. BAXTER, supra note 8.
18. $196.8 million/$27 million = $7.29. See also Daryl G. Pupera, Louisiana
Department of Economic Development and Louisiana Department of Revenue
Motion Picture Investor Tax Credit Program, Performance Audit, LA. LEGIS.
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money on the MPITC program at an alarmingly high rate, and the
rapidly increasing number of applications from production
companies wishing to utilize the program signifies even greater
losses in the future.19 Some claim the MPITC creates a so-called
“corporate welfare,” subsidizing wealthy movie producers at the
cost of Louisiana taxpayers.20 In the 2013 Louisiana Legislative
Session alone, two amendments to the MPITC were proposed and
one enacted.21Amid a hefty budget deficit, Louisiana is making huge
cuts to higher education and healthcare, while certifying $231
million in funds to subsidize the Louisiana film industry in 2012
alone.22 Thus, Louisiana’s film subsides are adding to an already
devastating budget shortfall.
The MPITC as a tax policy has gathered widespread support for
the creation of industry and jobs but is simultaneously receiving
heavy criticism for the high cost imposed on Louisiana taxpayers.23
To properly analyze any tax policy, analytical models separate
efficiency and equity concerns to gain the clearest view of the tax
policy’s effectiveness.24 The “optimal taxation” approach, one such
way to analyze a tax policy, seeks to find a tax configuration that
minimizes the loss in economic efficiency due to taxation while still
reflecting society’s attitude toward equity.25 Using the optimal tax

AUDITOR (Apr. 24, 2013), http://app1.lla.la.gov/PublicReports.nsf/5A685258
D794067E86257B57005B8D58/$FILE/00032357.pdf (“The result is a net [fiscal]
cost to the state of $169.8 million for the calendar year 2010.”).
19. -86.28% Return on Investment (“R.O.I.”) where R.O.I. = (Gain from
Investment – Cost of Investment)/Cost of Investment.
20. MATHIS, supra note 3.
21. H.B. 161, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013); Motion Picture Investor Tax
Credit, S.B. 165, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013). Sen. Martiny’s Senate Bill 165
was approved June 7, 2013.
22. John Maginnis, Louisiana’s Revenue Commission Looks for What Is
Broken, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 19, 2012, 8:49 AM), http://www.nola.com
/opinions/index.ssf/2012/09/louisianas_revenue_commission.html. (“Lawmakers
recognize that many of the existing 422 tax breaks do a lot of good, but they aren’t
sure which ones are not, or whether a fraction of the $6.8 billion total would not be
better spent on health care and higher education. . . . Louisiana’s generous motion
picture tax credit, at $174 million in F[iscal] Y[ear] 11 and growing, has brought
many productions and great industry exposure to the state, but, with some
exceptions, has not resulted in the permanent jobs and capital investment earlier
envisioned. But we are assured the pipeline of projects would quickly run dry
without the state subsidy.”).
23. Id. See also MATHIS, supra note 3; Bailey, supra note 12.
24. Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in
Tax Policy Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501, 502 (1997).
25. Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV.
39, 42 (1996).
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approach, this Comment suggests that although the MPITC may
provide benefits to the State, it must be scaled back to increase the
economic efficiency and increase equity in the treatment of
taxpayers.
Part I of this Comment explains how the MPITC awards credits
and how the resale market of those credits functions. Next, Part II
examines the efficiency of the MPITC, evaluating the tax credit
under three models of efficiency, which indicate the credit is
overaggressive and hence inefficient. Part III then scrutinizes the
inequities of the MPITC. Finally, Part IV proposes the following
three alterations to the program: (1) a statutory annual cap on the
MPITC; (2) a methodology for awarding those credits in an auctionlike system; and (3) an explicitly limited definition of production
expenditures. These alterations will make the MPITC both more
efficient and more equitable by decreasing the size of the program.
I. HOW THE MOTION PICTURE INVESTOR TAX CREDIT IS
DISTRIBUTED AND USED
The following discussion analyzes how Louisiana awards its tax
credit and how that credit is then used by the production. Before
credits are earned, the production must be state certified.26 State
certification has four components:
(1) The relevant department in, and the secretary of, the
Louisiana Office of Economic Development (LED) must
approve the production.
(2) The production must be domiciled and headquartered in
Louisiana.
(3) The production must have a viable multimarket
commercial distribution plan.
(4) The motion picture or television project must incur at
least $300,000 of production expenditures.27
Once a production is state certified, the investor is allowed a tax
credit of 30% of the base investment made by that investor.28 The
credits are awarded within 120 days of the receipt of the “production
audit report” certifying that “the report of production expenditures
presents fairly, in all material aspects, the production expenditures
26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009) (amended 2013).
27. Jayne A. Calhoun, Hooray for Hollywood! A Film-by-Film Primer on the
Louisiana Film Industry’s Blockbuster Success Thanks to Motion Picture Tax
Incentives, 58 LA. BAR JNL. 88, 90 (2010).
28. § 47:6007(B)(1). A “‘[b]ase investment’ means cash or cash equivalent
investment made and used for production expenditures in the state for a statecertified production.” Id.
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expended in Louisiana pursuant to [the provisions of the
MPITC].”29
The MPITC applies to a wide range of expenditures. The
legislation has defined “production expenditures” as:
[P]reproduction, production, and postproduction expenditures
in this state directly relating to a state-certified production,
including without limitation the following: set construction
and operation; wardrobes, makeup, accessories, and related
services; costs associated with photography and sound
synchronization, lighting, and related services and materials;
editing and related services; rental of facilities and
equipment; leasing of vehicles; costs of food and lodging;
digital or tape editing, film processing, transfer of film to
tape or digital format, sound mixing, special and visual
effects; and payroll. This term shall not include expenditures
for marketing and distribution, non-production related
overhead, amounts reimbursed by the state or any other
governmental entity, costs related to the transfer of tax
credits, amounts that are paid to persons or entities as a
result of their participation in profits from the exploitation of
the production, the application fee, or state or local taxes.30
This expansive definition contributes to a high volume of credits
awarded under the MPITC because practically any expense can be
argued to fit under it, particularly due to the “without limitation”
language.31
Once the credits are awarded, they are applied after the total
amount of tax liability due to the State is determined. Income taxes
are only imposed on taxable income.32 Taxable income refers to
total taxable income minus deductions.33 Taxable income is taxed at
a rate determined by the amount of taxable income earned.34 In
Louisiana, this rate is 6% for those whose taxable income exceeds
$50,000.35 Applying this rate to the taxable income determines the
29. Motion Picture Investor Tax Credit, S.B. 165, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La.
2013).
30. § 47:6007(B)(9) (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 42 (15th ed. 2009). “Louisiana taxable income is computed by
subtracting the federal income tax deductions allowed by [Louisiana Revised
Statutes section] 47:287.85 from Louisiana net income, after adjustments.” LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:287.79 (2001).
33. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 32, at 42.
34. Id.
35. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:287.12(3) (2001). A single taxpayer earning
more than $50,000 but not in excess of $100,000 dollars per year is taxed at 6%.
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dollar amount of tax liability.36 Credits can then be applied to this
amount to reduce the overall obligation of the taxpayer.37
To illustrate how the MPITC works using a simple example,
assume an investor expended the statutory minimum of $300,000 on
a movie filmed in Louisiana.38 Applying the MPITC’s 30% credit,
the investor thus receives a $90,000 tax credit for the $300,000
investment. Next, assume the movie earns $1 million, and the
investor is not realistically eligible for any deductions.39 The taxable
income is $1 million, and this amount is taxed at 6%.40 If the
investor had Louisiana income tax liability, the investor would owe
$60,000 to the State and could offset this by the $90,000 in earned
credits.41 Not only does the movie investor completely offset state
tax liability, but the investor also has $30,000 in leftover credits.
Compare this to an investor in the production of an unsubsidized
good in Louisiana. For instance, if an investor in widget production
earns $1 million and also expends $300,000, state income tax
liability would be approximately $60,000, or 6% of $1 million.42
The MPITC paid the movie investor’s state income tax liability and
also paid the investor $30,000 in leftover credits, compared to the
widget investor who had to pay the State the full $60,000 without
any help from the State whatsoever. The movie investor would have
$730,000 after-tax income, while the widget investor would have
just $640,000.43

The rate increases to 8% on Louisiana taxable income in excess of $200,000
dollars.
36. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 32, at 43.
37. Id. at 43.
38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009) (amended 2013).
39. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 32, at 323. Likely, almost any business actor
would be eligible for at least some deductions. This is because expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year are deductible and almost all business actors have
some expenses. However, for the sake of simplicity in the calculations, deductions
are assumed to be zero.
40. Id. at 46–47 (Taxable income = Gross income – Expenses – Possible
Deductions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:287.12 (2001).
41. The taxable income in this case is $1 million, taxed at 6%, meaning this
investor has a $60,000 state income tax liability. For simplicity, this model further
assumes a flat tax rate, meaning all income earned will be taxed at the highest rate.
42. The assumption of no business deductions is again unrealistic, but for the
ease of calculation deductions are assumed to be zero. Therefore, this investor is
taxed at 6% on the full $1 million in income, assuming a flat tax rate. This creates
the $60,000 state income tax liability.
43. The movie investor made $1 million, spent $300,000, but received
$30,000 in income tax credits, while the widget investor made $1 million, spent
$300,000, and received no assistance to pay state income tax liability.
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Out-of-state producers drawn to Louisiana by the MPITC rarely
have in-state tax liability, and even if they do, the value of the
credits often far exceeds it, leaving the producers with leftover
credits.44 The manner in which Louisiana handles those leftover tax
credits is one of the main sources of popularity of the program
because production investors may transfer or sell unused credits.45
When producers of films in Louisiana do not earn enough money in
state to take full advantage of the tax credits, they can sell the credits
back to the State or to entities that can use the credits themselves.46
This process, which is referred to as “monetization,” allows the
producers to trade in their credits for cash.47 The Louisiana
Legislature has continued to support the MPITC’s transferable
nature, unequivocally preserving the transferability of the credits,
despite calls for the disallowance of transfers.48
Though the MPITC explicitly allows those who were initially
awarded the credits to sell them to any willing party, regardless of
affiliation with the Louisiana film industry, the process is quite
complex. As such, technical know-how is required to facilitate a
transfer.49 Tax credit brokerage firms—which specialize in
monetization, certification, and the resale process—often assist film
productions with this complex process.50 They have relationships
44. RUTE PINHO, MONETIZING FILM TAX CREDITS (2011), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/rpt/2011-R-0462.htm. These producers are required to
file their state income tax in their home state, not Louisiana.
45. Calhoun, supra note 27.
46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007(C)(4) (2009) (amended 2013).
47. PINHO, supra note 44.
48. H.B. 161, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013) (proposed legislation that
would repeal the authority for the credit to be transferred or sold); Motion Picture
Investor Tax Credit, S.B. 165, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013) (preserved
transferability provisions as adopted by the Louisiana Legislature).
49. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:6007(C)(4) outlines the
requirements for transferability including a $200 fee. Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 47:6007(C)(4)(b) lays out the other requirements in pertinent part:
Transferors and transferees shall submit to the office, and to the
Department of Revenue in writing, a notification of any transfer or sale
of tax credits within thirty days after the transfer or sale of such tax
credits. The notification shall include the transferor’s tax credit balance
prior to transfer, a copy of any tax credit certification letter(s) issued by
the office and the secretary of the Department of Economic Development
and, the transferor’s remaining tax credit balance after transfer, all tax
identification numbers for both transferor and transferee, the date of
transfer, the amount transferred, a copy of the credit certificate, price paid
by the transferee to the transferor, in the case when the transferor is a
state-certified production, for the tax credits, and any other information
required by the office or the Department of Revenue.
§ 47:6007(C)(4)(b).
50. Bailey, supra note 12.
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with the major production companies and often buy huge quantities
of those companies’ leftover credits at a discount. The brokers then
go through accounting and business management firms to sell the
credits to taxpayers with large in-state tax liability, who then apply
the full value of the credits against their tax liability.51
Returning to the example of the minimum investor with $30,000
in leftover credits, the resale market would work as follows: The
investor would work with a brokerage firm to apply, certify, and
receive the credits. Then the brokerage firm would purchase the
leftover credits for some price, say $0.80 on the dollar. The
brokerage firm would work through the complicated transfer and
pay the minimum investor $24,000 for his leftover credits. Next the
brokerage firm would contact a purchaser—typically an accounting
firm—that would resell the credits to its clients to offset its clients’
tax liabilities.52 Louisiana Economic Development (LED) typically
places the resale value between $0.80 and $0.90 on the dollar.53
Presume the minimum investor used a broker that sold the credits
for $0.88 per credit; the broker would sell the credits to the
purchaser for $26,400. The purchaser could then offset its client’s
Louisiana tax liability by the full value of the credits, $30,000. In
this instance, the minimum investor made $24,000, the brokerage
firm made $2,400, and the purchaser of the credits pocketed $3,600
in offset tax liability.54
However, the role of brokers in the MPITC is waning. The State
dramatically altered the resale market in 2009 when the Legislature
added Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:6007(4)(f)(ii), which
authorizes investors to sell directly back to the State for $0.85 on the
dollar.55 As a result, the brokers now must pay more than the state
rate to remain competitive in the private resale market.
If a broker pays just over the state buyback value at $0.86 on the
dollar, the broker’s profit on the transaction with the minimum
investor shrinks to $600.56 Considering the $200 fee imposed by the
State and the complexity of orchestrating transfers, the broker would
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Film FAQ, LA. ECON. DEV., http://louisianaentertainment.gov/index
.php/film/faq/incentive.
54. The original producer was not only able to offset all state income tax
liability but also sold the credits to the broker for the cash equivalent of $24,000.
Although the purchaser of the credits paid just $26,400, the purchaser is able to
offset his Louisiana state income tax liability by the full amount of the credits,
$30,000. Therefore, the purchaser was able to pocket the difference, $3,600.
55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009).
56. The broker would purchase the credits for $25,800 and sell them for
$26,400.
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have little incentive to engage in this transfer.57 Further, some
production studios have become experts in the MPITC and the
transfer requirements.58 The studios then work directly with
accounting firms to sell the credits and bypass the broker’s
markup.59
While preserving the transferability of the MPITC, the
Legislature recently took steps to better regulate the transfer process
by establishing a central tax credit registry that specifically
addresses the resale markets.60 The Louisiana Tax Credit Registry
Act imposes notice requirements on both the transferor and the
transferee and provides for increased oversight of the resale market
by the Department of Revenue.61 Despite these changes, brokerage
firms still engage in MPITC transfers, but their role is increasingly
shrinking due to the State’s buyback program, the studios’ growing
expertise, and increased State oversight.
II. EFFICIENCIES: ELASTICITY, EXTERNALITY CONCERNS, AND
KALDOR–HICKS
The standard analytical model used in tax policy separates
efficiency and equity issues to determine the efficacy of a tax.62
Efficiency is subject to different interpretations, and there are many
conceptions of efficiency that can yield judgments of a tax policy.63
However, it is important to note that these models make a number of
assumptions, including the presence of rational actors and access to
perfect information. While this often is not the case, these concepts
still offer a valuable framework to make judgments about which tax
policies are most efficient. Using three of these efficiency concepts,
elasticity, externality concerns, and Kaldor–Hicks, it is evident that
the subsidy Louisiana is providing to film producers in the MPITC
is overaggressive and, therefore, inefficient.

57. See § 47:6007(C)(4).
58. Celtic Media Centre, which is located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
advertises on its website that The Celtic Group, owner of Celtic Media Centre,
“can help productions find Louisiana buyers for tax credits who may be willing to
pay better than $.85 on the dollar.” Tax Incentives, CELTIC MEDIA CENTRE,
www.celticmediacentre.com/filming_in_louisiana/tax_incentives.
59. Id.
60. Tax Credits, H.B. 377, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013).
61. Id.
62. Crawford, supra note 24, at 502.
63. Zolt, supra note 25, at 63.
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A. Elasticity of Supply and Subsidies64
To be an efficient subsidy, the MPITC must have the power to
draw film producers from out-of-state markets.65 From an
economics standpoint, price elasticity of supply is one way to
predict producers’ willingness to relocate based on the MPITC.
Price elasticity is an economic measure used to show the
responsiveness of film producers to price change.66 The supply of a
perfectly inelastic good will not change even with a significant price
change, while the supply of relatively elastic good will change more
significantly with price variation.67 Therefore, for the MPITC to be
efficient and actually draw new producers, the price elasticity of
supply for film production must be relatively elastic so that the
change in price draws producers. Unfortunately, deriving the actual
elasticity of supply for most commodities is a difficult task.68
However, looking at the factors affecting the elasticity of supply, it
can be reasonably inferred that film production in Louisiana is
relatively elastic.69
The primary factor that influences the elasticity of supply is the
availability of inputs, or how readily accessible the needed items for
64. This Section is derived from the idea of the Ramsey inverse-elasticity
rule. See generally F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37
ECON. J. 47 (1927). This rule states that the highest rate of taxes should be placed
on those goods with the most relatively inelastic demand or supply. Id. The idea is
that an efficient tax system will distort consumer and producer choice by the least
amount possible. Id. Because an inelastic demand or supply means actors do not
respond much to price change, placing a tax on those goods should not change
their choices. Id. However, Ramsey, the economist who first derived this theory,
did not believe in any subsidization, and therefore it would be incorrect to use the
inverse-elasticity rule he first posited to justify a subsidy. Id.
65. For the Louisiana MPITC to really work, it would seem that it would need
to attract out-of-state producers who would not have otherwise produced in
Louisiana. In other words, the central idea of the MPITC is to increase the amount
of money in Louisiana’s economy rather than just increase the number of citizens
making movies. There would seem to be little extra value in drawing Louisianans
to film production, and this could even be harmful by creating an oversupply of
filmmaking in Louisiana and an undersupply of other needed goods. If one
analogizes Louisiana’s economy to a pie, the goal is to grow the overall size of the
pie, not to divvy it up differently. That is, the goal should be to attract new
economic actors and their money rather than to encourage Louisianans to abandon
unsubsidized industries to work in film production.
66. PAUL KRUGMAN, ROBIN WELLS & KATHRYN GRADDY, ESSENTIALS OF
ECONOMICS 149 (Charles Linsmeler et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (stating that price
elasticity of supply measures the response of producers to price changes.).
67. Id. at 150.
68. Zolt, supra note 25, at 67.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 70–79 (concluding that the relevant
indicators suggest film production is relatively elastic).
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production are.70 California has the most readily available inputs for
film production due to its infrastructure, trained workforce, and
existing business base.71 However, the MPITC has helped draw
away significant numbers of productions.72 When the MPITC makes
film production cheap enough outside of California, producers will
be incentivized to relocate and can do so thanks to the film
industry’s mobile nature.73 Though the existing infrastructure in
California and the costs of moving production decrease the film
production industry’s elasticity, the overall mobility of the industry
allows producers to respond to changes in price with relative ease.74
Time is the second most important factor in determining the
price elasticity of supply.75 Generally, the longer any producer has
to respond to price changes, the more relatively elastic supply will
become because a longer timeframe allows a producer to make
necessary changes to the current production to account for the price
change.76 For instance, a film producer needs time to research the
MPITC and make the adjustments necessary to take advantage of it.
Generally, film productions are short-term projects that allow
little time for adjustments.77 Within productions, because of the
expediency of shoots, the production location is likely fixed, making
it difficult for the producer to respond to price changes during the
production of one film. However, because individual productions
wrap up fairly quickly, when a producer learns of a price change,
there is time to respond by changing the location for the next

70. KRUGMAN ET AL., supra note 66, at 150.
71. Alex Ben Block, Report Warns That California Isn’t Doing Enough to
Retain Movie, TV Productions, HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 14, 2012, 5:57 PM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/California-runaway-production-taxincentive-337952. Louisiana was the second most successful, behind only New
York, in drawing away productions from California during 2009 and 2010. Id.
72. Id.
73. Jeff Adelson, Film Tax Credits Cost State Too Much, Report Says,
NOLA.COM (Aug. 7, 2012, 9:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf
/2012/08/film_tax_credits_cost_state_to.html.
74. Zolt, supra note 25, at 63.
75. See KRUGMAN ET AL., supra note 66, at 150.
76. Id.
77. ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND
RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES (2009), available at http://www
.louisianaeconomicdevelopment.com/documents/additional-resources/ERA_Enter
tainment_Report.pdf. The Stanley Kubrick film Eyes Wide Shut was proclaimed
“one of the longest shoots ever bankrolled by a major studio” after it took around
three years to finish shooting. Benjamin Svetkey, “Behind the Scenes of “Eyes
Wide Shut”, ENT. WKLY. (July 23, 1999), http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,204
71622_272431,00.html.
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production.78 This also suggests a relatively elastic supply of film
production. Since relevant indicators suggest that the supply of film
production is likely elastic, assuming it is a reasonable goal to draw
more film production to Louisiana, the MPITC may be efficient
because it can effectuate its goal of drawing in new producers.79
B. Efficiencies and Externalities
Elasticity is just one method of evaluating tax policy efficiency.
In a perfectly competitive market, market demand and market
supply will intersect at the competitive equilibrium that is also the
most efficient point, and if it is not at that point, the market will
adjust to reach it.80 Therefore, if the film production market was in a
perfectly competitive equilibrium before the intervention of the
MPITC, the MPITC would be harmful because it would misallocate
resources.81 However, externalities often inhibit perfectly
competitive markets. An externality occurs when the action of one
party makes another party worse or better off, yet the first party
neither bears the cost nor receives the benefits of doing so.82
Externalities can arise either from the production of goods or from
their consumption.83 Externalities can be positive or negative.84
Possible positive externalities caused by the film industry’s presence
in Louisiana are the creation of thousands of new jobs and, in turn,
new taxpayers.85 A negative externality might be high levels of
pollution that make film production in Louisiana more costly.86
Both positive and negative externalities play an important role in
determining if the MPITC is efficient. Economists have generally
78. The producer is not locked into one location for long periods of time.
Because of the quick film shoots, the producer can switch locations before the next
production with ease.
79. Both the availability of inputs and time factor suggest a relatively elastic
supply.
80. BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 119–22, 135 (8th ed.
2011).
81. Interfering with a perfectly competitive market pushes the market to an
equilibrium that is inefficient. This inefficiency creates social loss, or what is
known in economic terms as “dead weight loss.” This loss occurs by prohibiting
wealth generating transactions that would have occurred but for the government
intervention. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 125
(Sarah Dorger et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2011).
82. Id. at 122.
83. For the purposes of this Comment, only externalities resulting from the
production of goods are relevant because the MPITC is a subsidy offered only to
film producers.
84. Id. at 123.
85. Lopez, supra note 10.
86. See infra note 99.
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accepted that where an externality is present, tax policy can be used
as a tool for correcting inefficiencies in the competitive allocation of
resources.87 However, to be efficient, the level of government
interference should mirror the size of the externality it seeks to
confront.88 Therefore, to determine if the MPITC is efficient based
on its ability to properly confront externalities, it must be
determined whether an externality exists and whether the externality
is of similar size to the MPITC.
1. Positive Production Externalities
Positive production externalities occur when a firm’s production
increases the well-being of others without compensation from the
benefitted party.89 Generally, it is best to encourage this positive
externality-generating activity to increase the benefits produced to
other members of society.90 To do this, the government subsidizes
the behavior that generated the positive externalities so that the
market price reflects the social value of the good.91 The social value
of the good is the private value to consumers plus the value of the
positive externalities the good generates.92 Tax credits can achieve
this social value of production by making a good less expensive to
produce so that producers will be incentivized to produce more of
this positive externality-creating commodity.93
87. Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities, 77
SWEDISH J. OF ECON. 86, 86 (1975), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable
/3439329.
88. Id.
89. GRUBER, supra note 81, at 128.
Imagine the following scenario: There is public land beneath which
there might be valuable oil reserves. The government allows any oil
developer to drill in those public lands, as long as the government gets
some royalties on any oil reserves found. Each dollar the oil developer
spends on exploration increases the chances of finding oil reserves.
Once found, however, the oil reserves can be tapped by other
companies; the initial driller only has the advantage of getting there
first. Thus, exploration for oil by one company exerts a positive
production externality on other companies: each dollar spent on
exploration by the first company raises the chance that other companies
will have a chance to make money from new oil found on this land.
Id.
90. Id. at 129.
91. Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency
and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23,
44 (2006).
92. Id.
93. Clinton G. Wallace, The Case for Tradable Tax Credits, 8 N.Y.U.J.L. &
BUS. 227, 228–30 (2011).
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Motion picture production in Louisiana is subsidized through the
MPITC because the credits make production less expensive for
producers.94 This would only be efficient if in-state film production
generated positive externalities, and the level of the subsidization
would only be efficient if it equaled the value of the positive
externalities being generated.95 Possible positive externalities caused
by film production include manual labor work, catering,
transportation, and financial services, which also create thousands of
new jobs and, in turn, new taxpayers within Louisiana.96 Production
staff frequent local businesses, which also causes many positive
externalities. If these staffers are from out of state, the money they
spend in local businesses would not have otherwise been infused
into Louisiana’s economy. Additionally, the new group of producers
may entice other new businesses to relocate to Louisiana.
Although some positive externalities may be generated, for the
MPITC to be efficient it is also essential that the level of the subsidy
balance the externalities. The value of positive externalities is
difficult to derive because it is impossible to differentiate between
positive economic effects that are a result of the newly created film
industry and those effects attributable to other factors. For instance,
if an out-of-state worker from a film goes to a coffee shop everyday
and spends money at that business, this is a positive externality. The
only way to attempt an exact calculation of the positive externality
generated by this worker, however, would be to require film workers
to identify themselves to businesses where they spend and for
businesses to record and report these sales separately from their
regular business. However, considering the amount of credits
awarded under the MPITC—$231 million from just 2011 to 2012—
the positive externalities would need to be huge for the MPITC to be
efficient.97
Louisiana has yet to witness this scale of positive economic side
effects.98 From 2009 to 2012, real GDP grew in Louisiana by an
average of 1.975%.99 Compared to the amount being spent on the
94. See discussion supra Part I.
95. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
96. Lopez, supra note 10.
97. Maginnis, supra note 22.
98. The average percent change in Real GDP from 2009 to 2012 was a modest
1.975% (3.2% in 2009; 5.8% in 2010; -2.6% in 2011; 1.5% in 2012). News Release,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Widespread
Economic Growth in 2012, Table 1, available at http://www.bea.gov
/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2013/pdf/gsp0613.pdf. Comparatively, Louisiana’s
Real GDP growth ranked 30th in 2012. Id.
99. Id. It is important to note this figure encompasses the Great Recession;
however, comparing Real GDP growth to other states yields the conclusion that
Real GDP growth in Louisiana during this time was conclusively weak.
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MPITC by Louisiana, this GDP growth is unimpressive and
indicates that whatever positive production externalities created are
not large enough to justify the MPITC’s massive size.
2. Negative Production Externalities
Negative production externalities occur when a firm’s
production reduces the well-being of others who are not
compensated by the firm.100 Generally, the government provides
subsidies to industries that would otherwise under-produce due to
various market and governmental failures or externalities.101
Subsidization through a tax credit is arguably more efficient than
subsidization via direct governmental grants because the cost of
determining which projects to subsidize is allocated to individuals
receiving the credit.102 This means those recipients will choose to
subsidize their most valued project, and the government will not
have to waste resources figuring out which projects to subsidize.103
However, this subsidization is only efficient where there is a
negative production externality present and the subsidization is
commensurate to the externality.
Louisiana had a film industry before tax credits, which in itself
is evidence there was never a large-scale negative externality facing
Louisiana.104 The success of the old Louisiana film industry was
borne mostly by New Orleans as a popular setting for storylines and
on-location filming.105 Yet, even outside of the traditional New
Orleans film industry in Louisiana, the State has a varied landscape
that is attractive to film production. As one commentator noted,
100. GRUBER, supra note 81, at 124. The classic example of a negative
externality is pollution. For instance, say a steel plant is located next to a river and
dumps the sludge produced as a by-product into the river. This sludge then floats
downstream into a traditional fishing area. The sludge kills the fish and imposes a
cost on the fisherman who finds it increasingly more time consuming to find live
fish.
101. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax
Subsidies, 91 B.U.L. REV. 601, 611 (2011).
102. Id. at 612.
103. Id.
104. Vicki Mayer & Tanya Goldman, Hollywood Handouts: Tax Credits in the
Age of Economic Crisis, JUMP CUT, http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc52.2010
/mayerTax/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). Early films like Mephisto and the Maiden,
1909, Tarzan of the Apes, 1918, and My Old Kentucky Home, 1922, attracted
directors, actors, and other early film professionals to the State.
105. Filmography: 1898–1980, LA. FILM MUSEUM, http://louisianafilm
museum.org/Louisiana_Filmography.html (listing early Louisiana films such as
The Flame of New Orleans, 1941, Panic in the Street, 1950, A Street Car Named
Desire, 1951, King Creole, 1958, Toys in the Attic, 1963, The Cincinnati Kid,
1965, Easy Rider, 1969).
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“Louisiana isn’t just the boisterous Big Easy, soggy bayous and
graceful old plantations draped with Spanish moss. The northeast
has pine, forests, rolling hills and small towns that can double for
many other places.”106 Louisiana also boasts a lower cost of living
than the national average and much lower cost of living than the two
largest film-producing states, California and New York.107
Additionally, Louisiana ranks far below New York and California
on the Milken Institute’s Cost-of-Doing Business Index.108 Because
Louisiana can be easily transformed to fit almost any setting and the
cost of living in Louisiana is much lower than California and New
York, it is likely that Louisiana would be an attractive location for
film productions even without the MPITC. Given the lack of any
evidence of a large-scale negative externality present in the
Louisiana film industry, far less costly means like advertising or a
less expansive tax credit program could have enticed production in
Louisiana.
This is not to say that Louisiana would be as attractive for film
production without the MPITC as it is with the tax program. Rather,
there is simply no evidence of a large-scale negative externality
present in the pre-MPITC film industry in Louisiana such that
substantial government intervention was necessary. However, this
lack of evidence also does not preclude the existence of small
externalities that would not be evident from the pre-2002 Louisiana
film industry. Such negative externalities might be high crime rates,
prevalence of natural disasters, or other factors that are keeping film
producers who would otherwise choose to film in Louisiana from
doing so.109 Although not disposing of the possibility of small
externalities, this evidence shows that large-scale negative
106. Iain Blair, Pros Pick Best Places for Filmmaking, VARIETY (Oct. 23,
2009), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118010354?refCatId=3782.
107. Cost of Living, CITYRATING.COM, www.cityrating.com/cost-of-living
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013). The consumer price index (CPI) in Louisiana is
5.36%, lower than the national average. New York’s CPI is 15.18% higher than
the national average, and California’s is 6.25% higher than national average.
108. THE MILKEN INSTITUTE, MILKEN INSTITUTE: 2007 COST-OF-DOINGBUSINESS INDEX (2007), available at www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/2007Costof
DoingBusiness.pdf. New York ranked 2nd, while California is ranked 4th and
Louisiana is ranked 26nd on the index. Id.
109. Louisiana has been ranked for the past 20 years as the most violent state
in the United States according to a report from the Institute of Economics and
Peace. Meg Handley, Louisiana Most Violent State in U.S., U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REP. (May 7, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/05
/07/louisiana-most-violent-state-in-the-us. Louisiana has been ranked as the most
disaster-prone state in the nation, largely because of Hurricane Katrina, which was
the costliest disaster in U.S. history. Cameron Huddleston, Top 10 States Most at
Risk of Disaster, KIPLINGER (June 19, 2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/top10-states-most-at-risk-of-disaster.html.
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production externalities were not present in the Louisiana film
industry before the MPITC was instituted. The size of a subsidy
confronting a negative externality should mirror the size of that
negative externality.110 The current size of the MPITC—$231
million from 2011 to 2012—would only be appropriate from an
efficiency perspective if large-scale negative externalities existed.111
Yet, because there is no evidence of such a negative externality
present, this level of government intervention is overaggressive and
inefficient.
C. Kaldor–Hicks Efficiency as a Cost–Benefit Analysis
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency is yet another metric used to measure
the efficiency of tax policies.112 Under this model, a state of affairs
is only Kaldor–Hicks efficient if the “winners,” or those better off in
the move to a new state of affairs, can fully compensate the “losers,”
those whose welfare diminished.113 Before 2002, the film industry in
Louisiana was unsubsidized.114 To estimate if the new state of
affairs is efficient, one must consider the two parties: Louisiana
taxpayers and the producers of the films made in Louisiana. The
producers represent those whose welfare is increased by the move to
the new state of affairs in which film production in Louisiana is
generously subsidized by the MPITC, while the taxpayers represent
those whose welfare has been diminished because other beneficial
uses for tax dollars must be forgone to fund the MPITC. Therefore,
if the post-MPITC state of affairs is to be Kaldor–Hicks efficient,
the producers must be compensating the Louisiana taxpayers.
Performing a cost–benefit analysis creates a clearer picture of if
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency is being reached through the MPITC.
According to a recent study, Louisiana certified $196.8 million in
film tax credits in 2010 alone.115 During that same year, the MPITC

110. A tax used to correct an externality should “confront the externality with a
price reflecting the damage (or benefit, as the case may be).” Sandmo, supra note
87, at 86.
111. MATHIS, supra note 3.
112. Crawford, supra note 24, at 516.
113. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad:
Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their
Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 999 (2010)
(citing JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 98 (1988)).
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009).
115. Millhollon, supra note 13. These economic contributions include payroll,
purchases, and other economic activity in Louisiana. Id. This equates to roughly
$1.00 of state tax income for every $7.29 in credits.
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generated an estimated $27 million in state tax revenue.116 That was
a dismal return on investment at about -86.28%.117 However,
welfare economics’s notion of individual well-being is concerned
with more than just simple returns on investment, and it incorporates
any other return in value, however intangible.118 Therefore, to
address whether the producers are compensating the Louisiana
taxpayers, more than just simple returns on investment must be
analyzed.
1. Benefits of the MPITC
Positive impacts of the film industry are often broken down into
“direct” impacts and “indirect” impacts.119 Direct impacts include:
employment of a local workforce and external production such as
rooms at area hotels or increased restaurant and retail revenue.120
Indirect impacts are the non-quantifiable effects that film production
has on the local economy such as feelings of excitement and pride
that Louisianans experience.121
In regard to direct impacts, the film industry brings numerous
jobs to the State, many of which are higher paying than other jobs in
Louisiana.122 According to a 2009 Project Report, “[p]revious
efforts at workforce and infrastructure development are beginning to
pay dividends, and new businesses have been founded and are
moving to the state from elsewhere.”123 The average hourly wage
for those employed in the motion picture industry is generally much
higher than those employed in all other industries.124 For instance,
writers and authors working on a motion picture earn 56% more on
116. Id. See also Joseph Henchman, Important Questions to Ask in Evaluating
a Film Tax Incentive Program, TAX FOUND (Mar. 22, 2012), http://tax
foundation.org/article/important-questions-ask-evaluating-film-tax-incentive-pro
gram. Another independent study found the return, accounting even for movieinduced tourism, increased business to non-film businesses and other indirect
effects is on average between $0.13 and $0.15 on the dollar. This study supports
an R.O.I. approximately between -85% and -87%.
117. Return on Investment = (Gain from Investment – Cost of Investment)/Cost
of Investment.
118. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 967 (2001).
119. LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA
INDUSTRIES, supra note 77.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 24.
122. Grand, supra note 11. Employment in film production tends to pay higher
wages than comparable employment using the same skills. Id.
123. LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA
INDUSTRIES, supra note 77, at 1.
124. Id.
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average than writers and authors who work in other media.125 On
average a worker in the media industry earns 20.33% more per hour
than the national average for all workers.126 This is a welcome trend
in Louisiana, as the per capita personal income in the State ranks
31st in the United States.127
Because of the contingent and transient character of employment
in the motion picture industry, employment is difficult to
measure.128 However, studies show that film industry employment
has increased at a compound annual growth rate of 22% from 2001
to 2007.129 Louisiana also boasts the film industry’s fifth highest
“location quotient,” or proportion of workers in a particular industry
in a state compared to the national employment in that industry.130
In 2007 alone, expenditures of film producers taking advantage of
the credit created 6,230 jobs.131 This increase in jobs coupled with
the higher paying nature of film industry employment is certainly a
great benefit to Louisianans.
In addition to the jobs directly related to production, local
sectors—such as transportation, lodging, car and truck rentals, gas
stations, food and beverage establishments, retail, construction and
repair, equipment rentals, personal, business, and government
services—all benefit from production.132 Out-of-state producers and
their employees spend money in multiple sectors that would
otherwise not benefit Louisiana residents and businesses.133 Such a
boon to the local economy is a further direct benefit to Louisianans
as a result of the MPITC.

125. Id. at 23.
126. In Louisiana, the mean hourly wage for all occupations in 2012 was
$18.86, compared to those in arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media
occupations who earned a mean hourly wage of $21.33. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAY 2012 STATE OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
AND WAGE ESTIMATES LOUISIANA (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov
/oes/current/naics4_512100.htm#00-0000.
127. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE: UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
PERSONAL INCOME PER CAPITA IN CURRENT DOLLARS (2007), available at
http://www.census.gov/statab/ranks/rank29.html.
128. LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA
INDUSTRIES, supra note 77, at 6.
129. Id. at 28.
130. Id. at 31 (as of 2007).
131. Id. at 32.
132. Id. at 23. A greens man or costume designer working on a film production
can earn nearly double their regular earnings from what they would otherwise
make in a non-production-related job.
133. Grand, supra note 11.
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Indirect benefits such as the increased excitement and pride of
local residents have garnered widespread attention in Louisiana.134
As previously stated, Louisiana is ranked third in the country in film
production activity, behind only California and New York.135
Productions spurred by the credit have helped earn Louisiana the
nickname “Hollywood South,”136 a moniker in which many
Louisiana residents take pride.137 The MPITC has created many
direct and indirect benefits to the State’s economy and people.
2. Costs of the MPITC
With benefits readily flowing into Louisiana, the MPITC has
gained great support throughout the State.138 However, many remain
skeptical, and state representatives have voiced concerns over the
program’s effective job creation and ability to spur a self-sustaining
film industry, urging that the program needs to be reevaluated.139
Although many proponents tout job creation in the State, a large
portion of the jobs that film productions create, especially those with
the highest pay, are actually filled by nonresidents.140 Furthermore,
the jobs that are created by the MPITC are very expensive for the
State. By one estimate, each job created by the MPITC costs the
State $60,000.141 On average, Louisiana spent 9% more to create
each job than the average salary earned by a Louisiana film
worker.142 This 9% is spent just on those positions that are actually
filled with Louisianans, which is not always the case.
134. Even Sen. Mary Landrieu has recently expressed excitement over
“Hollywood South,” tweeting “Louisiana’s film industry is giving #Hollywood a
run for its money. Congrats to Hollywood South on its 2 #Oscarnoms.” (referring
to Beasts of the Southern Wild and Django Unchained’s combined seven
Academy Award nominations in 2013). Alicia M. Cohn, Sen. Landrieu ‘Proud’ of
Louisiana-Filmed Oscar Nominees, THE HILL (Jan. 10, 2013, 12:17 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/twitter-room/other-news/276491-sen-landrieu-proud-oflouisiana-filmed-oscar-nominees.
135. Lopez, supra note 10.
136. Bailey, supra note 12, at 715.
137. Elizabeth Vowell, Hollywood South Wraps 2012, Looks Forward to 2013,
WAFB NEWS (Dec. 31, 2012), http://wsmv.membercenter.worldnow.com/story
/20475797/hollywood-south-wraps-2012-looks-forward-to-2013.
138. Id.
139. Millhollon, supra note 13. State Rep. “Jim Fannin, D-Jonesboro, who
sponsored the State’s budget bill, said the film production tax credit program
needs to be reviewed because it does not appear to be cost effective.” Id.
140. Id.
141. Adelson, supra note 73. “The state’s film tax credits cost the state about
$60,000 for each direct job they create.” Id.
142. MAY 2012 STATE OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES
LOUISIANA, supra note 126. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, workers
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Film production is a highly mobile industry.143 In general, most
crewmembers are hired locally, while top personnel, like directors
and producers, travel extensively from job to job.144 These
nonresident top personnel enjoy the best jobs with the highest
incomes.145 Even the local crewmember jobs are characterized by
seasonal, short-term projects in Louisiana, not full-time, year-round
employment as in other parts of the country.146
Additionally, there is extreme competition between states and
other countries, making it difficult for one location to become the
clear winner of the “film subsidy war.”147 Louisiana and New
Mexico currently enjoy a “first-mover advantage” because they
were the first states to enact film incentives.148 However, a firstmover can only capture most of a market where an industry is
characterized by a tendency of firms to cluster together and requires
a large initial investment.149 Because film production is such a
mobile industry, agglomeration is unnecessary.150 Recall, film
production has a relatively elastic supply making it receptive to
price changes.151 Therefore, the first-mover advantage may be shortlived and is possibly unsustainable in light of increased competition.
While the MPITC has generated excitement, job creation, and a
prevalent industry, the cost of this creation is enormous to Louisiana
taxpayers.152 Not only is the basic return on investment -86.28%, but
the jobs created also cost Louisiana far more than those jobs actually
pay Louisiana workers.153 In 2002, the Louisiana Legislature set out

across the nation in art, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations earn
an average of $54,490. Id. Compared to the $60,000 average spent to create each
job, the cost to create a job is approximately 9% higher than the average salary
earned.
143. Adelson, supra note 73.
144. ROBERT TANNENWALD, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATE
FILM SUBSIDIES: NOT MUCH BANG FOR TOO MANY BUCKS (2010), http://www
.cbpp.org/files/11-17-10sfp.pdf (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA
INDUSTRIES, supra note 77.
147. TANNENWALD, supra note 144.
148. See LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL
MEDIA INDUSTRIES, supra note 77.
149. ENRICO MORETTI & DANIEL J. WILSON, FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN
FRANCISCO, STATE INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION, STAR SCIENTISTS AND JOBS:
EVIDENCE FROM BIOTECH (July 2013), available at http://www.frbsf.org
/economic-research/files/wp2013-17.pdf.
150. Adelson, supra note 73.
151. See discussion supra Part II.A.
152. See MATHIS, supra note 3.
153. See supra notes 118, 143.
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to “encourage development in Louisiana of a strong capital and
infrastructure base for motion picture production in order to achieve
an independent, self-supporting industry.”154 Yet, the past ten years
have indicated the industry is hardly self-supporting.155 Since 2002,
Louisiana taxpayers’ welfare has been diminished by diverting state
funds to support the film industry without adequate compensation
from film producers who benefit greatly from the MPITC. Because
there has not been adequate compensation from those whose welfare
has increased to those whose welfare has diminished, the MPITC is
overaggressive and not Kaldor–Hicks efficient.
D. Consolidating Efficiency Analyses
These three conceptions of efficiency help draw the conclusion
that the MPITC is overaggressive, but this does not mean the MPITC
is without merit. Film production is the type of industry that responds
well to subsidization because of its relatively elastic supply.
Additionally, film production produces some positive externalities,
and the possible presence of small negative externalities may warrant
some government intervention in the film production market. Also,
Louisianans benefit from the new, subsidized state of affairs in
several capacities. Nevertheless, the sheer size of the MPITC renders
it inefficient. The analysis of the three theories of efficiency indicate
that while subsidizing the film industry may be a good general
strategy, the program’s over-aggressiveness renders it inefficient. As
this Comment later argues, Louisiana may be able to retain the
benefits of the MPITC by reducing the scope of the tax program.156
III. “LIFE IS A BANQUET, AND MOST POOR SUCKERS ARE STARVING
157
TO DEATH”:
EQUITY CONCERNS OF THE MPITC
In addition to devising an efficient tax scheme, tax policymakers
must consider the fairness of a tax design.158 However, fairness of a
tax system greatly depends on perspective,159 and though everyone
may agree that taxation should treat taxpayers equitably, they may
not agree on what constitutes “equitable treatment.”160
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009).
See generally BAXTER, supra note 8.
See discussion infra Part IV.
AUNTIE MAME (Warner Bros. Productions 1958).
LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP TAXES AND
JUSTICE 149 (2002).
159. Zolt, supra note 25, at 43.
160. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 158, at 162.
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Tax equity is usually bifurcated into two concepts: vertical
equity and horizontal equity.161 “Vertical equity” means the degree
of fairness in the treatment of people at different income levels,
while “horizontal equity” means the fairness in treatment of people
at similar income levels.162 However, tax scholars generally believe
that vertical equity is more analytically fundamental.163 This is
because horizontal equity is only significant if people believe
persons with the same levels of income should be taxed differently,
which is largely untrue.164 Therefore, this Comment is only
concerned with vertical equity, or the fairness of the MPITC’s
treatment of people at different income levels. An analysis of the
MPITC’s treatment of people at different income levels indicates
that the MPITC unfairly benefits the wealthy and harms the average
Louisiana taxpayer due to its massive size.
The MPITC only allows the wealthy to displace their tax
burdens; only wealthy film producers with large budgets can take
advantage of the program,165 and the credits are only awarded to
those productions that are able to demonstrate a viable multimarket
commercial distribution plan and incur at least $300,000 of
production expenditures.166 These requirements are easily met by
productions backed by the six largest movie production
companies,167 which command approximately 90% of the U.S. and
Canadian box office.168 The cost of producing and marketing these
large feature films averages about $100 million per film.169
Independent filmmakers outside of the major six production studios,
however, simply do not have the means to qualify for the credit.170
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009).
166. Calhoun, supra note 27, at 90.
167. See generally BAXTER, supra note 8, at 11 (“The motion picture industry
has historically been dominated by several large studios based primarily in
Hollywood. These include Sony Pictures, 20th Century Fox, The Walt Disney Co.,
Warner Bros, Paramount Pictures, and NBC Universal.”).
168. Bryan Ross Bieber, Analysis of the Independent Film Industry, BRB
PRODUCTIONS (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.bryanbieber.com/2009/09/analysis-ofthe-independent-film-industry.
169. BAXTER, supra note 8, at 11.
170. “Independent films” are those films produced outside of the major six
Hollywood production companies. Digital film has helped increase film
production dramatically. Bieber, supra note 168. In 2008 alone, 5,000 films were
submitted to the Sundance Film Festival. Id. Because of the increased supply, it is
no longer possible to approach a major studio and have them commit to
distribution. Id. Given the high-capital investment necessities imposed to meet the
requirements to receive the credits, including a viable multimarket commercial
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Moreover, it is not just among film producers that the MPITC
causes such great disparity in vertical equity. The private resale
market also functions to only allow the wealthy to offset their tax
liability. Because of the complicated nature of monetizing and
transferring the credits, it is extremely risky to engage in their resale
without professional assistance.171 Since the accounting firms that
typically facilitate credit transfers only do so when a client has a
significant state income tax liability,172 it would likely be very
difficult for taxpayers willing to take the risk of purchasing credits
without professional assistance to even access the credits for sale.173
However, the non-wealthy might benefit from other aspects of
the MPITC. Job creation and possible positive externalities benefit
both the wealthy and non-wealthy.174 Yet, because the wealthy can
offset their tax liability while the non-wealthy cannot, there is
significant vertical inequity. This is an important concern given the
magnitude of the program, particularly in light of Louisiana’s
current budget crisis.175 As Jan Moller, the director of the Louisiana
Budget Project, stated, “It’s a question of priorities and [the
Louisiana Budget Project] think[s] it’s probably time to start
reigning in the cost of these subsidies . . . . The question is not

distribution plan, independent film producers cannot reap the benefits of the
program. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007(C)(1)(c)(i) (2009) (amended 2013).
Only the wealthy major Hollywood studios can easily take advantage of the
MPITC, while modest, small, independent producers will likely find the credits
unobtainable.
171. See discussion supra Part I.
172. Because of the amount of hours of work a completed transfer takes even
tax professionals, most accounting firms would not consider the transfer unless
their client had a significant income tax liability. While difficult to determine an
exact threshold, most accounting firms would begin to consider using credits if
state income tax liability was significant.
173. The key is that the larger the volume per transfer, the less credit sellers
have to pay in transfer fees and the less work they need to put into transfers.
Sellers of credits have little incentive to sell in small quantities and pay a fee of
$200 per transfer when large brokers of accounting firms can buy all their credits
with just one transfer fee. Revenue Information Bulletin No. 10-022 State of
Louisiana Department of Revenue (2010). A $200 fee per transferee is imposed.
174. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
175. Paul Rioux, Gov. Bobby Jindal Says Budget Crisis Calls for Spending
Cuts, Not Tax Increases, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 19, 2011, 4:17 PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/04/gov_bobby_jindal_says_budget_c
.html. Gov. Bobby Jindal referred to a $1.6 billion budget shortfall as the State’s
next major crisis. Id.
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whether we want the film industry here, the real question is what are
we willing to pay to bring them here?”176
Louisiana is making huge cuts to state expenditures that benefit
the wealthy and non-wealthy alike, such as healthcare and
education, while significantly increasing spending on film subsidies
that benefit the wealthy over the non-wealthy.177 From a vertical
equity standpoint, the current trend of the MPITC is undesirable
because it only benefits the wealthy and not the typical Louisiana
taxpayer.178
However, this is not to suggest that subsidizing film productions
is per se inequitable. Rather, the level of subsidization is inequitable
given the current state of the Louisiana budget. If the size of the
MPITC is scaled back and the disparity between the wealthy and
non-wealthy lessened, then the MPITC could achieve more vertical
equity. Additionally, if less state funds went to subsidizing films,
more funds could be allocated to government and private sector
programs that benefit both wealthy and non-wealthy residents.

176. Brittany Weiss, La. Film Tax Credits Becoming Costly, WBRZ.COM (Oct.
18, 2012, 4:46 PM), http://www.wbrz.com/news/la-film-tax-credits-becomingcostly/. Note that the Louisiana Budget Project is a part of the Centers on Budget
and Policy Priorities that describes itself as a “policy organization working at the
federal and state levels on fiscal policy and public programs that affect low- and
moderate-income families and individuals” and is known to be somewhat liberal
leaning. See About, OFF THE CHARTS BLOG, http://www.offthechartsblog
.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2013); see also Harold Pollack, Where’s the
Conservative Counterpart to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities?,
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2012, 11:47 AM), http://theincidental
economist.com/wordpress/wheres-the-conservative-counterpart-to-the-center-onbudget-and-policy-priorities (noting the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities is
“avowedly liberal”).
177.
Lawmakers recognize that many of the existing 422 tax breaks do a lot
of good, but they aren’t sure which ones are not, or whether a fraction
of the $6.8 billion total would not be better spent on health care and
higher education . . . . Louisiana’s generous motion picture tax credit, at
$174 million in [Fiscal Year] 11 and growing, has brought many
productions and great industry exposure to the state, but, with some
exceptions, has not resulted in the permanent jobs and capital
investment earlier envisioned. But we are assured the pipeline of
projects would quickly run dry without the state subsidy.
Maginnis, supra note 22.
178. Increasing spending on things that heavily benefit the wealthy over the
non-wealthy, while making large cuts to that which benefits both the wealthy and
the non-wealthy alike, is contradictory to the principles of vertical equity.
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 158, at 162 (noting vertical equity is what fairness
demands in the tax treatment of people at different levels of income).
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IV. THE SHOW MUST GO ON: REFORMULATING THE LOUISIANA
MOTION PICTURE INVESTOR TAX CREDIT
This Comment has shown that while the MPITC is generally an
effective means to incentivize film production, the overaggressive
nature of the MPITC renders it inefficient and inequitable. In order
to better effectuate a self-sustaining film industry, the MPITC must
be re-envisioned to “limit the cost to taxpayers without pulling the
rug out from under the industry.”179 By implementing two changes
to the programs, the MPITC will become more efficient and will
produce more vertical equity. First, this Comment advocates for a
statutory annual cap on the MPITC and an accompanying auctionlike system for awarding available credits. Second, this Comment
suggests an explicitly limited definition of production expenditures
to mitigate risk associated with credits and decrease the amount of
expenditures that qualify for the MPITC.
A. Imposing a Statuary Annual Cap on the Amount of Credits
Awarded
In order to provide for a more efficient tax scheme, the
Legislature should impose a statutory annual cap on the amount of
credits the LED may award. By offering a tax credit of 30% of
production expenditures, Louisiana already provides one of the most
attractive film subsidies in the nation.180 This rate is much higher
than those in other states, and other states are further reducing their
rates.181 Because of this comparatively higher rate, the MPITC will
continue to incentivize out-of-state producers to film in Louisiana,
while the imposition of a cap would limit the cost to taxpayers.
The statutory annual cap on the MPITC should be placed at a
level low enough that producers must be competitive to obtain the
credits but not so low as to discourage producers from applying for
fear of rejection. The preference of Louisiana taxpayers to invest in
film production in the State, especially amid cuts to healthcare and
higher education, should also be included to address equity
concerns.182 New Mexico recently capped its program at $50 million
179. David Jacobs, La. Budget Project Recommends Scaling Back Film
Incentives, BATON ROUGE BUS. REP. (Aug. 7, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://www.225
batonrouge.com/article/20120807/BUSINESSREPORT0112/120809841.
180. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009).
181. Joseph Henchman, More States Abandon Film Tax Incentives as
Programs’ Ineffectiveness Becomes More Apparent, TAX FOUND. (June 2, 2012),
http://taxfoundation.org/article/more-states-abandon-film-tax-incentives-programs
-ineffectiveness-becomes-more-apparent.
182. Maginnis, supra note 22.

2014]

COMMENT

607

per year and employed a rolling cap process that allows productions
to carry leftover tax credits over into the ensuing fiscal year once the
cap is reached.183 New Mexico certified $65.9 million in tax credits
in 2010, and the subsidy rate was 25%.184 Therefore, the $50 million
cap was about 23% lower than the previous year’s open-ended
level.185 This follows the national trend of states’ attitudes toward
film tax incentive programs, as 16 states have dropped, suspended,
or drastically scaled back their programs.186 The following graph
illustrates the national spending trends with regard to film tax
credits.187
Average Film Tax Credits State Spending
(millions)
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Louisiana should follow these national trends. There is little risk
that film producers will begin to prefer other states’ subsidies
because other states’ rates are not nearly as high as the MPITC’s,
and Louisiana can save a significant amount by capping the credits.
Additionally, since New Mexico has capped its level 23% lower
than Louisiana’s open-ended level,188 Louisiana can reduce its
183. MATHIS, supra note 3.
184. Richard Verrier, New Mexico Senate OKs $50-million Cap on Film Tax
Rebates, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011
/mar/17/business/la-fi-0317-ct-new-mexico-20110317.
185. ($50 million cap – $64.9 million 2010 level)/ $64.9 million 2010 level.
186. Henchman, supra note 181. Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, New Jersey, and Washington all either suspended or dropped their
programs. Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin all scaled back. Id.
187. Id.
188. See supra note 186.
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subsidy level by at least that amount without worry that a cap will
shift preferences toward New Mexico.
In 2011 to 2012, Louisiana paid $231 million in credits at a 30%
rate.189 However, this was a sharp spike from previous years.190 On
average, Louisiana has spent about $153.82 million on film tax
credits per year in the past five years.191 Because Louisiana has a
much larger uncapped level of credits awarded, the cap should be set
at a similar percent decrease as the New Mexico program so as not
to “pull the rug out from under the industry.”192 Using New
Mexico’s 23% scale back as a benchmark, Louisiana should
decrease its average uncapped level—$153.82 million—by 23%.193
This would mean a statutory cap placed around $118.44 million.
B. Auctioning off the Credits
Decreasing the overall size of the MPITC will address the
inefficiency created by the program’s massive size. Additionally, the
State should adopt an auction-like system to disperse the credits.
Because the MPITC is so lucrative for film producers, offering one
of the largest film tax credits in the nation, the cap will introduce
scarcity into the market for Louisiana film tax credits that will in
turn create beneficial competition among producers.194
The LED currently awards credits to producers after considering
the criteria set out in the MPITC, which provides, in pertinent part,
that when determining which productions should be awarded
credits, the LED “shall take the following factors into consideration:
(i) [t]he impact of the production on the immediate and long-term
objectives of this Section [and] (ii) [t]he impact of the production on
the employment of Louisiana residents.”195 The purpose of the
MPITC is to “encourage development in Louisiana of a strong
capital and infrastructure base for motion picture production in order
189. MATHIS, supra note 3.
190. Id.
191. Id. (stating that the State spent the following: $231 million in 2012,
$179.5 million in 2011, $165.6 million in 2010, $101 million in 2009, and $92
million in 2008).
192. Leslie Turk, Scrutiny Heats Up on State’s Film Incentives, ACADIANA
BUS. (Aug. 7, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://www.theind.com/business/11129-scrutinyheats-up-on-states-film-incentives.
193. MATHIS, supra note 3.
194. The Legislature has recently shown a continued commitment to the
lucrative nature of the tax credits by declining to enact a proposed amendment that
would have scaled the MPITC back to a 15% credit. H.B. 161, 2013 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (La. 2013).
195. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009).
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to achieve an independent, self-supporting industry.”196 To best
effectuate these goals, the LED should award those credits to the
productions that meet the two-part test laid out in the legislation.
In the proposed auction-like system, producers will present their
prospective films to the LED and compete for the lucrative credits.
The LED will decide to which films to award the credits based on the
extent to which the films will impact development of a strong capital
and infrastructure base and the employment of Louisiana residents.197
Producers looking to ensure that their film secures the lucrative
credits will make sure their production is appealing to the LED,
possibly based on plans to use or invest in Louisiana production
studios or promises to hire more Louisiana workers on a long-term
basis. This will sufficiently address one of the largest complaints
about the MPITC: Production companies are not hiring Louisiana
workers long-term.198 If only those producers who demonstrate a plan
that effectuates the statutory goals are awarded the lucrative credits,
producers in the auction system will compete head-to-head to show
that their production will best benefit the State. A yearly auction
system for the credits will help the LED determine which productions
should be awarded the credit and will help enhance competition
between producers, which benefits the State by addressing the
efficiency and equity concerns.
C. Narrowing the Definition of Production Expenditures
The final suggested change is to tighten up the notion of production
expenditures. Currently, the legislation defines production expenditures
as:
[P]reproduction, production, and postproduction expenditures
in this state directly relating to a state-certified production,
including without limitation the following: set construction
and operation; wardrobes, makeup, accessories, and related
services; costs associated with photography and sound
synchronization, lighting, and related services and materials;
editing and related services; rental of facilities and equipment;
leasing of vehicles; costs of food and lodging; digital or tape
editing, film processing, transfer of film to tape or digital
format, sound mixing, special and visual effects; and
payroll.199
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
TANNENWALD, supra note 144.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009) (emphasis added).
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The open-ended language, particularly the inclusion of the phrase
“without limitation,” leads to several unwarranted costs of the
program. These costs translate to inefficiency and inequity in the
MPITC.
This Comment advocates for the removal of the phrase “without
limitations” to cut costs of the MPITC by allowing fewer items to
qualify as production expenditures, which would result in fewer
credits awarded. This loose definition of production expenditures
lends itself to shrewd investors taking advantage of the MPITC
without actually contributing to the Louisiana film industry.200 The
investigation and eventual recapture of these questionable credits is
costly to the LED and in turn to the State. Moreover, many of these
questionable production expenditures likely go unnoticed, imposing
unwarranted costs.
A more absolute definition of production expenditures, like an
explicit listing in the absence of the “without limitation” phrase, will
decrease the number of falsely awarded credits and hence slash the
costs associated with their recapture. Leaving this language openended only encourages clever obstructions and increased costs for
the LED.201 Finally, if fewer items qualify as production
expenditures, fewer credits will be awarded. Cutting these costs will
decrease the overall size of the MPITC. This will address both the
efficiency and equity concerns about the MPITC.

200. A notable controversy surrounding what actually qualifies as a production
expense under “set construction and operation” occurred in 2009. Jeff Adelson,
Movie Tax Credit Projects to be Checked for Abuse, NOLA.COM (July 11, 2012,
10:30 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/07/movie_tax_credit
_projects_to_b.html. Blaine Kern Artists and its partner, Louisiana Entertainment
and Productions, claimed to have spent about $3.4 million producing a
documentary called “Blaine Kern’s Mardi Gras: Building of the Greatest Free
Show on Earth.” Kern and his associates were awarded about $1 million in credits.
However, only about $173,000 was actually spent on expenses for making the film
while the rest was spent on the production of the floats—Kern’s usual expenses
incurred for the work he did for carnival krewes. Id. The LED then conducted an
audit and found the credits were wrongfully awarded because the building of the
floats did not count as a production expenditure. Id. The LED commenced
recapture of the already awarded credits and is now considering imposing criminal
liability on Kern and his associates. Id. Stephen Moret, Economic Development
Secretary, says now there are enough controls in place to prevent this type of
misuse, but there is still no definitive answer about what exactly falls under the
category of “production expenditures.” Id.
201. The LED is a government entity. Although this change may not decrease
the direct costs of the MPITC, it will reduce government costs indirectly. This still
decreases the overall impact of the MPITC on Louisiana’s budget.
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CONCLUSION
Although on the right track, evaluation of the MPITC under an
optimal tax theory analysis indicates that the current program is
overaggressive, causing both inefficiency and inequity. The best
way to make the program more efficient and more equitable is to
decrease its overall size without eliminating the incentives for
producers to relocate to Louisiana. Two ways to subtly decrease the
size of the MPITC are to impose an annual statutory cap on the
amount of credits awarded and narrow the scope of production
expenditures that are eligible for credits. Altering the way the
limited credits are allocated would also make the MPITC more
beneficial to Louisiana. Using these three strategies, Louisiana can
continue to enjoy benefits of becoming “Hollywood South” in a
more efficient and equitable manner.202
Amelia Hurt∗

202. Recently, Gov. Bobby Jindal proposed eliminating the Louisiana state
income tax. Mike Scott, Film Industry Leaders Say Jindal Tax Plan Would
Cripple Production; Administration Disagrees, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 19,
2013, 7:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/movies/index.ssf/2013/03/louisiana_film
_leaders_says_ji.html. Scrapping state income tax liability would render the
MPITC credit as is essentially valueless because the credit functions to offset state
income tax liability. Id. However, the plan was met with strong opposition,
particularly from those looking to protect the Louisiana film industry. Mike
Hasten, Louisiana Senator Vows to Protect Movie Credits, SHREVEPORT TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.shreveporttimes.com/article/20130319/ENT21
/130319026/Louisiana-senator-vows-protect-movie-credits. Although the plan
subsequently failed, many forecast that there will be a resurgent push to eliminate
the state income tax in the future. Luke Johnson, Bobby Jindal Scraps Plan to
Eliminate State Income Tax After Outcry, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2013, 4:33
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/08/bobby-jindal-income-tax_n_303
9317.html. If the state income tax is eliminated, the above analysis would surely
be altered; however, the MPITC credit would be re-envisioned to offset another
form of state tax liability.
∗ J.D./D.C.L., 2014, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
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